Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Dan Heller's avatar

I think the bigger picture is being missed here. And I really don't want to engage for too long on this, as its outside the main intent of my substack, which is really about the intricacies of T1D management, which includes both biology and the utilization of tech.

The main critique of Hunterbrook's analysis was not necessarily the list of problems they cited, which the commenters in this discussion (and elsewhere online) have focused on. It was THAT those situations arose because executive management is showing an inability to either avoid these problems, or fix them. Worse still, they reflect poor strategic planning (market projections and future product development).

The company has never been able to grow without expanding beyond the T1D space, so their ambitions naturally encroach on the T2D market, and life-hackers (non-diabetics who like to use wearables for physical performance tracking).

It's in that light that Dexcom's goal affected product decisions. First, the aimed claim the most "accurate" sensor on the market, which meant achieving a very low MARD rating. T do that, however, the algorithm the determines each glucose reading needs to closely match the blood glucose analyzer in clinical trials. The mistake was assuming that these superior MARD ratings would actually yield a superior device.

As the product rolled out, quite the opposite has happened.---AID systems perform worse and most users got frustrated not actually knowing how to interpret glucose movements.

They should have known--or at least, prepared for--the fact that MARD itself is the wrong way to measure the performance of a CGM. The way glucose moves in the body is more erratic and volatile (as my original article explains in detail), so matching glucose levels only ended up reflecting that erratic movement. As was later discovered, this is not a very useful metric for T1D management.

This not only has impacted the G7's sales, but has moved many G6 users to other products.

Worse, the strategic missteps are going to get worse as the company prepares to roll out the next generation of sensors that will measure ketones as well. This is going to be a risky and expensive turning point because DKA is more of a boogeyman that doesn't really pose a threat for most T1Ds, despite how often it's discussed with healthcare providers. The *fear* of it is real, but as my article details, the actual risk is extremely low. See: https://danheller.substack.com/p/ketones-the-unjustly-demonized-villain

Once the new CGKM products hit the market, it'll take a few sales cycles where people will start reporting that detecting ketones is much ado about nothing, and this could impact sales, because those devices will cost a lot more than a non-ketone CGM.

If that happens alongside the continued slide of the G7, then Dexcom's price could suffer even more.

Key takeaway: This is not about T1Ds, and it's not about intermittent problems with the physical device and customer service that could (and may) be fixed. Those are important *because* they reflect an executive team that is unprepared to play in the major leagues, especially when it comes to making strategic decisions.

I posted this because I feel very strongly about Dexcom's threat to discontinue the G6, which I find to be THE most effective tool for T1D management. Its readings are highly reliable for making in-the-moment dosing the decisions in a shorter window of time than any other sensor on the market. Again, I encourage people to read my original analysis on the G6 vs. G7 from two years ago: https://danheller.substack.com/p/the-dexcom-g7-vs-g6-which-is-better

Expand full comment
Lisa Vaas's avatar

... and the Libre siren call grows sweeter still...

Expand full comment
18 more comments...

No posts

Ready for more?